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Abstract. Until recently, elected authorities in Peru were allowed to run for re-election. 
The objective of this study is to test whether voters reward (or punish) elected authorities 
according to expenditure performance. In particular, I measure the probability of a mayor 
being reelected subject to their capital expenditure throughout the four-year term. I study 
the two most recent electoral terms: 2006-2010 and 2010-2014. To deal with the 
endogeneity of capital expenditure, the model controls for a number of characteristics of the 
elected authority and his or her political party (including the share of voted obtained in the 
previous election), for district characteristics and for other characteristics of the 
municipality. I find that mayors who get reelected for another four-year termare 
characterized by high levels of capital expenditure throughout the periods of 2007-2010 and 
2011-2014. In particular, the years before the electoral processes, 2009 and 2013, seem to 
be of vital importance to determine the outcome of an election. A more refined question is 
answered by looking at both timing and type of expenditure which reveals that the 
electorate values the provision of public goods such as security, electrification, education, 
health and roads during the electoral term. Voters tend to punish projects related 
totransportation, communications and plumbing, which are characterized by the destruction 
of roads in the electoral years. 
Keywords. Reelection, Decentralization, Public capital expenditure, Local governments. 
JEL. D72, D73, H70. 
 
1. Introduction 
ntil recently, elected authorities in Peru were allowed to run for immediate 
re-election. The electoral reform took place in March 2015 with the 
promulgation of the 30305-2015 law that prevents district mayors from 
running for immediate reelection. The factors that contribute to the reelection of a 
district mayor have not been studied in Peru.I test for the impact of capital 
investment on the probability of reelection of mayors in Peru. There are 1838 
provincial and district municipalities throughout the country as of 2015. However, 
the scope of this research focuses on district municipalities. I have hypothesized 
that capital expenditure has a positive impact on the probability of the political 
reelection of mayors throughout the country. In other words, if mayors experience 
high levels of capital expenditure, they will increase their probability of 
beingreelected for a second term. Also, the different types of public investments 
such as capital expenditure in education, health, communications, and many others 
should increase or decrease the probability of reelection. Thus, the electorate will 
award incumbent mayors with their votes if they are perceived to make an efficient 
use of the allocated resources. Moreover, I will also explore other factors that could 
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increase or decrease the probability of being elected for a second termsuch as 
personal, municipal, district-level characteristics and the types of capital 
expenditures.  
There has been little debate about the question itself in Peru. Research has been 
made on the debate that deals with the conundrum of whether decentralization 
improves social welfare or not (see Oates 1972, 1985; Steiner, 1999; Rodden, 
2003). Scholars are interested in the evaluation of whether this allegedly 
democratic process provides a benefit to local populations once policies have been 
implemented. From an economic perspective, we should be concerned with this 
question because it affects millions of people who are not fully integrated into the 
market economy of Peru. That is the reason why the government intervenes 
through capital investment, in order to correct market failures and reach out for 
those who need investment the most. Duggan & Martinelli (2014) maintain that 
elections can serve as mechanisms of accountability that successfully align the 
incentives of politicians with those of voters.  
Additionally, budget assignments, decentralization, and a recent electoral 
reformseem to be of importance as well since mayors can no longer be 
immediately elected for a second term and the new legal framework could affect 
decentralization and development of rural areas themselves. In 2006, regional 
governments managed approximately 20% of the national budget. In 2010, regional 
governments and local governments managed almost 38% of the national budget 
and in 2014, 37% of the national budget. Hence, mayors and regional presidents in 
Peru have a significant amount of the national budget at their disposal. That is why 
the question of whether the capital expenditure carried out by them, which is 
endogenous, has an influence on their reelection process. There is no evidence or 
research paper that links reelection and public expenditure in Peru.  
The objective of this research is to study the relationship between public 
investment and the probability of reelection of mayors in Peru for two reelections: 
for those who started in 2006 and decided to run for reelection in 2010 and for 
those who started in 2010 and decided to run for reelection in 2014.  The applied 
methodology is a logistic regression to estimate the impact of capital expenditure 
on the probability of reelection at the aggregate and disaggregate level. There is an 
identification problem that is discussed becauseI suspect that there is a possibility 
that our estimates are biased. Specifically, capital expenditure could be correlated 
with non-observable characteristics of the mayor that could also have an effect on 
the probability of being reelected such as the human capital of the mayor, work 
experience, ability, etc. The way in which I solve this problem is by using the 
percentage of votes obtained in a previous election. That instrument allows to 
account for the non-observable variables that could bias the results. A secondary 
objective is to identify other determinants of the reelection process.  
The methodology of this paper concludes that capital expenditure throughout 
the years in office has a positive impact on the probability of reelection of mayors 
and that there are certain types of expenditures such as investments that could 
increase and decrease the probability of being reelected. In the same manner, 
carrying out capital expenditures in the electoral years such as 2010 and 2014 
could reduce the probability of being reelected if capital expenditures in 
transportation or plumbing are carried out. The characteristics of the incumbent 
tend to increase the probability of reelection before the type of political of political 
party they are a part of. Thus, if somebody is a member of a regional movement or 
a national political party does not seem to be significant in terms of increasing or 
decreasing the probability of winning an election.The Peruvian electoral seems to 
favor personal characteristics rather than political machinery. The characteristics of 
the district can reduce the probability of being reelected if the district is poor.  
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My contribution to this political economy discussion is the link between 
political reelection and capital expenditure at the local government level in Peru. 
The methodology used is a logistic regression model where I use data from mayors 
who were elected in 2006 and run for reelection in 2010 and also for those who 
seek reelection in 2014 after being voted for office in 2010.The databases to 
construct the dependent variables were provided by both the National Office of 
Electoral Processes (OficinaNacional de ProcesosElectorales, ONPE), and National 
Jury of Elections(JuradoNacional de Elecciones, JNE). Information on capital 
investment and current expenditure was acquired from the Ministry of Economics 
and Finance of Peru (MEF) from 2007 to 2015.  Information on the characteristics 
of the district were obtained from theCooperation Fund for Social Development 
(Fondo de Cooperaciónpara el Desarrollo Social, FONCODES) map of poverty 
and altitude observations from the Ministry of Climate (Ministerio del Ambiente, 
MINAM). Information on population size was obtainedfrom the National Institute 
of Statistics and Informatics (InstitutoNacional de Estadística e Informática, INEI). 
Information on the particular characteristics of each municipality was extracted 
from the National Registry of Municipalities (Registro Nacional de 
Municipalidades, RENAMU).  
This question is important because the capital budget is assigned each year to 
cover the basic necessities of the poorest places in Peru. The notion behind 
government intervention through capital expenditure is that it intervenes in the 
absence of a market economy. Hence, a place with little private investment might 
be benefited by public investment and government intervention. Moreover, it 
would be interesting to explore if the previous system and reelection framework, 
before the 2015 electoral reform, worked under the reasonable incentives to benefit 
both the electorate and politicians and whether two terms were considered 
sufficient by the electorate to carry out an efficient administration process. This 
type of research has not been done in Peru. This is a political economy paper.   
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the context is introduced, in 
section 3 a conceptual motivation of our study is provided. Section 4 discusses the 
databases. Section 5performs an empirical exploration. Section 6introduces the 
empirical strategy and methodology. Section 7 outlines the results andsection 8 
provides additional insights about the impact of the capital expenditure on the 
probability of being reelected as a conclusion.  
 
2. Decentralization, budget allocation, and local elections in 
Peru  
In 2001, after the Fujimori regime ended, President Alejandro Toledo was 
elected and the Toledo administration advocated a different approach towards 
public investment: fiscal decentralization. The Toledo administration believed that 
in order to achieve a more democratic country, the regional and local governments 
should carry out public investment. Therefore, the process of decentralization 
started when power was removed from the central government and ceded to the 
regional and local governments. The title of regional president (similar to state 
governor in the U.S.) was created in 24 departments and 1 constitutional province 
in Peru. Their task was to coordinate with the Ministry of Economics andFinance 
(MEF) the amount of resources needed to develop economicallyeach of the 25 
regions.  
The Peruvian budget operates under the SIAF and SNIP systems. Local 
administrations send their projects to the M.E.F. where they enter a process of 
evaluation. There, consultants that evaluate the impact, benefit, viability of the 
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project at the OPI, which is the office that deems themviable or not.There is a high 
rejection rate of projects each year as indicated by Figure 1. 
 















Source: Banco de Proyectos SNIP 
 
This process of depuration of projects allows for the proper incentives to take 
place to prevent mayors from using the budget at their complete disposal to further 
their political needs. Through this process, efforts are being made to allow projects 
that, in theory, benefit local populations in Peru to take place. As a result, the 
screening of projects is carried out under several controls. 
Also, the Budget Commission at the unicameral Peruvian Congress works with 
representatives from regional and local governments, the MEF to negotiate the 
allocation of thebudget, which is later made legal when Congress is in session. 
Local governments such as district and provincial municipalities are to coordinate 
with the regional governments the amount of resources they need to allocate to 
each of their local governments in order to fulfill the needs of their populations 
(MEF).  
 
3. Literature review 
The decentralization process has been an issue of international debate in the last 
few years as Loayza et al (2014) point out when they stressthat “in the last three 
decades, emerging countries have gone through extensive decentralization reforms 
that devolved fiscal and administrative authority to regional and local 
governments”. 
Economists such as Oates (1999) maintain that it makes local authorities “more 
accountable”. There is this notion that local governments should be able to manage 
their resources because mayors and local authorities are more aware of the 
necessities of the local population as opposed to the technocrats in Lima, the 
capital of Peru. Other economists maintain that the central government should 
determine the necessities of the country in order to develop it economically. Smoke 
(2001) argues that evidence of a positive impact of decentralization reforms in low 
and middle income countries remains mixed in aspects such as public finance, 
health reform, among others. Smoke & Lewis (2003) stress that the little capacity 
of local managers has been identified as a bottleneck for a successful 
decentralization.We will explore this issue in relation to public finance for the case 
of Peru since the context of this paper operates within the decentralization reform. 
The decentralization debate has sprouted several doubts as to whether the 
budget is being used properly or not. Loayza et al. (2014) study the case of Peru in 
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“More Than You Can Handle”. They maintain that there are several constraints to 
spend their budget: budget size and the allocation process, local capacity, local 
needs and political economy constraints. As a consequence, investments have 
lagged behind and regions have not experienced the expected growth. Moreover, 
capital investments carried out are not always what the local population needs and 
several have resulted in corruption scandals from several local authorities ranging 
from regional presidents to local mayors and minor government officials.  
There is a debate about whether decentralization should be gradual. Those who 
argue in favor of gradual decentralization maintain that there are certain 
prerequisites such as having educated and politically aware voters, the prevalence 
of law and order, fair elections, effective political competition, capable local 
administration and the prevalence of an effective oversight mechanism (Loayza et 
al., 2014). 
However, my focus deals with the possible purpose or intention of the capital 
expenditure. My contribution to this literature is to test whether political ambition, 
specifically the reelection process interacts with capital expenditure. Rodden et al. 
(2003) maintain that irresponsive spending due to soft budget constraints has a 
detrimental effect. Smoke & Lewis (1996) stress that “poor capacity of local 
administrators has been identified as an important bottleneck for successful 
decentralization” which is in the same line of thought as Loayza et al. (2014) when 
they stress that municipal workers have been incapable of spending their budget 
due to several human capital constraints. Furthermore, “the size and sophistication 
of projects may also affect spending” making human capital a valuable asset for the 
municipality and, possibly, for the reelection process.  
Additionally, Smoke (2001) maintains that local administrators have been given 
“too much functional responsibility rapidly and without appropriate capacity 
building.” This is important for my research since data from the MEF provides us 
with detailed capital expenditure divided into 25 different types of investments. 
Due to the decentralization reform, municipalities, regional governments must 
coordinate with the MEF and Congress (the Budget Commission) to secure funding 
for their current and capital expenditures a year ahead.   
Our motivation comes from “budget related issues, in particular the adequacy of 
the transferred budget with respect to the local capacity are among the most 
important determinants of the spending ability” (Loayza et al., 2014). That is the 
reason why I use 25 different types of spending to capture the effect. 
Chattopadhyary & Dufflo (2004) and Caselli & Michaels (2009) maintain that 
gender, elite capture, revenues from natural resources affect the type of spending. 
However, Araujo et al. (2008) maintainthat elite capture may not play such a 
relevant role as opposed to studies that look at the governance of decentralization.  
For the case of Peru, much has not been written. Castro & Torres (2014) in 
“Changes in the electoral rules and number of parties: Evidence from a natural 
experiment in Peru” study the impact of the 29470 law that modified the rules of 
the regional elections. The new law demanded a new round of elections if no party 
reached a total of 30% of valid votes at the regional elections. The intention of the 
law is to make parties more legitimate by giving them more votes. The research 
suggests that regional parties (or movements) increased, that the results are robust 
and a proliferation of regional movements throughout the country has taken place, 
which is consistent with the data from the ONPE and JNE. 
There is also a self-selection problem. Not all elected officials run for 
reelection. Some of them might not think they could win again and they decide to 
stay out of the race. This paper aims to answer those questions with data from the 
ONPE and JNE. Our purpose is to study those mayors who seek reelection and the 
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possible causes of their reelection. A methodology to estimate the proclivity of 
running for reelection is also used.  
Most of the literature that has to do with voting and economic conditions studies 
the impact on senators, congressmen and congresswoman, state governors and 
presidents, but not mayors. However, in Canada, Cameron et al (2011) from the 
University of Western Ontario, decided to study the “economic voting and 
incumbent mayoral elections in Canada from 1997 to 2010”. They test the 
economic voting theory at the local level in Canada. The theory suggests that 
incumbent office holders are more (less) likely to be re-elected when the economy 
is doing well (poorly). They also mention the influence of the “Michigan School” 
which follows the fundamental premise of economic voting that when voters enter 
the ballot box a prime consideration influencing their voting decision is an 
evaluation of incumbent performance. An incumbent is rewarded (or punished) at 
the ballot for good (or poor) economic conditions. This goes in line with our 
hypothesis. We argue that voters will reward mayors and municipal administrations 
that they perceive as efficient localadministrators.  
Also, Owens & Wade (1992) suggest that with respect to rational economic 
voting, voters who regard the government as having done well at economic 
management during its current term will reward it with their votes at the next 
election. If there are unfavorable economic conditions, voters will punish the 
incumbent candidates. They are working with data from 1970s onwards in 
Japanese House elections. This finding supports our hypothesis because we have 
argued that voters will reward mayors with their vote if they feel the impact of the 
local government upon their economic condition. This is consistent with the 
findings of the paper and similar empirical exercises from Brazil and Portugal. 
Capital expenditure carried out throughout the term as a mayor, before the electoral 
year seem to influence the probability of reelection in a positive manner. 
Particularly, the year previous to the electoral year seems to be the most important.  
Anderson & Morgan (2011) also mention a difference between the “real” and 
the “subjective” economy. The “real” economy pertains to actual objective 
economic conditions like unemployment rates, inflation or GDP growth. The 
subjective economy is made up of perceptions of economic conditions. They exist 
in the mind of individual voters. If voters think or believe that the economy is 
doing well (poorly) then they are more (less) likely to vote for the incumbent 
candidate, party or executive. This is consistent with interviews carried out at the 
ONPE in Peru. Specialists in research maintain that some mayors might be prone to 
perform capital expenditures in visible areas that might inducea prospective 
electorate to believe that the local administrationis carrying out investment projects 
for the benefit of the local population.  
The theoretical framework fits in the literature of fiscal decentralization and the 
efficiency of government discussed by Porcelli (2009). He maintains that there are 
two types of theories: the classical and the second-generation theory. The classical 
theory deals with the Tibout’s model of local public good provision (Tiebout, 
1956) where decentralization takes place with mobile households and public 
government compete in offering a mix of tax and public goods. The second-
generation is proposed by Oates (1972) when he postulates the Decentralization 
Theorem that solves the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision 
of public goods in favor of decentralized provision of public goods if preferences 
differ across regions and spill-over effects are absent. The assumption behind this 
theorem is that governments operate in order to maximize social welfare. The 
Decentralization Theorem fits our scenario where the country is geographically 
different and ethnically diverse and necessities differ from region to region.  
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Some principal agent models of electoral accountability are likely to explain 
this research. Votersare the principals, politicians are the agents and the presence of 
asymmetric information between them can be seen as the main reason why 
government performance is inefficient. Decentralization can reduce information 
asymmetry. In this way, the electorate can increase their control over politicians to 
stimulate more electoral accountability that would translate into more efficient 
government activity (Lockwood, 2007).  
Working papers from Brazil, Portugal and a cross-section analysis provide 
evidence for capital expenditure and the probability of reelection as a mayor 
(Sakurai & Menezes 2008). They find that high levels of capital expenditure in the 
years previous to the electoral year increase the prospects of being reelected. 
Katsimi & Sarantides (2011) maintain that incumbents tend to prioritize current 
expenditure rather than capital expenditure, which is observed in the empirical 
exploration of this paper where current expenditure tends to be higher than capital 
expenditure.  Moreover, in Portugal, between 1979-2011, Veiga and Veiga (2007) 
find that capital expenditure near the electoral years and during the electoral term 
increases the percentage of votes obtained by incumbents at the ballots. Similar 
studies have not been carried out for the case of Peru.  
My contribution to the literature is to test whether capital expenditure increases 
the probability, the type of capital expenditure that does so, and, personal, local 
level and district characteristics that could impact as well. Thus, a more 
comprehensive approach that could serve as an explanatory model for the 
reelection process in Peru.This has not been done for the case of Peru and the 
papers that deal with similar questions do not address the different types of capital 
expenditure that could increase the prospects of a reelection.  
 
4. Data aspects 
This research draws information from several detailed databases containing 
information at the municipal level (local government). There are 1838 local 
governments (1643 districtand 195 provincial municipalities) in Peru. The focus of 
this paper is to study the district municipalities. I have information for all district 
municipalities on public finance, personal, district and municipal-level 
characteristics.  
4.1. Electoral Information 
The JuradoNacional de Elecciones (JNE) and the ONPE, the public entities 
responsible for the organization and execution of the electoral processes, provided 
information on a number of important variables to construct the dependent 
variables: reelected in 2010 and reelected in 2014. We take into consideration the 
incumbents who sought reelection and those who did not in this paper. Thus, the 
dependent variable is a 1 if reelected and 0 otherwise. The information provided 
includes full name, age, place of origin, political party affiliation, type of political 
party affiliation, number of votes each candidate obtained during the election 
process, number of invalid votes, number of absent voters, among others. We have 
information for the electoral processes that took place in: 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 
and 2014 for all the available municipalities. In this manner,the information allows 
us to identify if a mayor was an incumbent and ran for reelection in 2010 or 2014, 
and study the impact of public expenditure on the probability of being reelected by 
combining the databases bases from the MEF and the electoral processes. Thus, I 
can indicate if a candidate ran for reelection, did not run, run for another office, etc. 
For the period of 2002-2006, 347 mayors were reelected. For the term 2006-2010, 
314 mayors were reelected in 2010 from the 1615 who were elected in 2006. For 
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the 2010-2014term, 293 of the 1605 mayors who initiated their terms in 2011 were 
reelected in 2014. 
One of the most important variables to accurately replicate the results from the 
electoral organisms is the National Document of Identity (DocumentoNacional de 
Identidad, DNI) which is the Peruvian ID. It allows for a comprehensive follow-up 
of individuals throughout years, election processes and if one of them decides to 
run for something different than a mayor, they can be easily tracked down and 
eliminated from the database of interest. This single tool allows for the accurate 
identification throughout time and electoral processes of an individual in a clean 
manner.  
It must be noted that the ubigeos (the unique code used to identify departments, 
provinces and local districts in Peru) reported by the JNE and ONPE are different 
from the ones used by the INEI and other entities in Peru. Therefore, to perform a 
perfect match once all the appropriate databases for this study have been created, 
the merging of databases must be carried out by the names of the departments, 
provinces and local districts. If the merging process is not done so in this manner, 
one could end up with the same ubigeos, but describing different districts.  
4.2. Capital investment and current spending 
The Ministry of Finance and Economics (MEF) procured information on capital 
and current expenditure for the 1838 municipalities in Peru. For 2007, we only 
have information on 739 local governments since the SIAF program was still being 
implemented for municipalities. But for the 2008-2015period, information for the 
1838 local governments is available at a disaggregated level. Not all 1838 are 
present throughout time, since some of them have recently been created. However, 
there is information on every existing district at the time.Also, the observations 
used are annual aggregatesand it is granular to the point where 25 different types of 
capital expenditure (funciones) can be studied at the municipal level. In other 
words, if roads were being built by the Municipality of Bagua in 2008, the budget 
from that capital expenditure and the amount executed will be present in our 
database. The available variables are accrued amounts (devengados) and modified 
institutional budget (presupuestoinstitucionalmodificado, PIM).The fact that the 
information is fully available from 2008 onwards limits our research to the time 
scope of 2008-2014. For that same reason, even though there is information 
available for the electoral processes from 1998 through 2014, only the elections of 
mayors who were elected in 2006 and ran for reelection in 2010 and those who 
were elected in 2010 and ran for reelection 2014 can be explored.  
In order to construct the percentage of the executed budget, the amount accrued 
in one year is divided by the budget. These two variables will result in total budget 




= %  𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡     (1) 
 
This is the standard measure used by the MEF and the SIAF system in order to 
keep track of the percentage of the budget being used, the percentage of capital and 
current expenditures carried out by local governments.We hypothesize that 
municipalities with high percentages of capital spending will increase the 
probability of reelection of their mayor. On the MEF website, the budget can be 
tracked on a daily, monthly and yearly basis. However, following Loayza et al 
(2014) approach the annual aggregates seem to be appropriate for the analysis since  
“most capital expenditure is concentrated towards the end of the year and is as a 
result comparing periods other than full years would be misleading.” Hence, we 
construct several indicators of percentage of budget executed: percentage of capital 
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expenditure and percentage of current expenditure on a yearly basis from 2008 to 
2014. These indicators will be the independent variables. Also, we perform the 
same exercise by type of expenditure.  
Additionally, other indicators are constructed as alternative measures of 
robustness. The accrued amounts are divided by the local population to obtain an 
indicator of per capita budget expenditure. These variables are created for capital 
and current expenditures. They provide an insight into how much money is being 
invested by the government on education, transportation, health and other 
important public investments that could influence the probability of reelection.  
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛 𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= % 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎    (2) 
 
Thirdly, another indicator is created: accrued amount per voter. This could also 
indicate the amount of budget executed by the local administration directed 
towards voters. In particular, the study of the capital expenditure per voter is of 




= % 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟    (3) 
 
The indicator of interest is the percentage of capital expenditure carried out on a 
yearly basis by the local administration. A more refined analysis studies the 
different percentages of capital expenditure carried out per type of investment such 
as transportation or education. In order to provide consistency and robustness, the 
same controls are used in conjunction with the budget expenditure per capita and 
budget expenditure per voter.  
4.3. Municipal characteristics  
The National Registry of Municipalities (RegistroNacional de Municipalidades, 
RENAMU) contains observations form 2002-2014 on several municipal 
characteristics such as website, main activities carried out by the mayor, number of 
sessions carried out by the council, among others. For the purpose of this research, 
the human capital statistics are used as control variables to increase the robustness 
of the results. In Loayza et al. (2014), the findings shed light on the impact of 
human capital on capital expenditure. For example, the higher the level of 
education of the workers at the municipality, the more complex investments they 
will be able to carry out.  
The presumption is that they are more qualified to manage the budget. Extreme 
examples are given where people with high school degrees work at the 
municipality and they have to prepare the forms to build a hydroelectric dam. The 
human capital needed to perform high budget projects is not always available and 
local administrators might not be able to carry out public expenditures accordingly. 
The available variables are the number of males and females working at the 
municipality and also the differentiated levels. There is information on whether 
they are directors, professionals, technicians, auxiliary workers, janitors and 
workers contracted via a third contractor (services). The number of workers differs 
from municipality to municipality. As a result, percentages of workers were 
constructed by type.  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦  𝑜𝑓  𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠
= % 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦    (4) 
 
Thus, the number of professionals is divided by the total number of workers to 
obtain the percentage of professionals present at any given municipality. The same 
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is done for each category of directors, technicians, among others in order to create 
a comparable variable among the studied municipalities. 
4.4. District-level characteristics  
The INEI has population data and estimates for the years 2000 to 2015. They 
are based on several national censuses, the last one took place in 2007. There is 
information of projected population at the district, provincial, departmental and 
national level. These data is valuable to control for district population and to 
construct capital expenditure per capita indicators at the district level. The 
population variable is used as a control variable in the probabilistic model.  
The Cooperation Fund for Social Development (FONCODES) poverty map 
provides further characteristics of the district. The variables are at the municipal 
level only available for 2007. Poverty quintiles 1 through 5 are variables that 
indicate the level of poverty of the population, 1 being the poorest and 5 being the 
less poor. The percentage of the rural population is also found. These variables will 
also be used as controls in the probabilistic model.  
The Ministry of Climate (MINAM) provides information of the altitude of each 
district in Peru. It is an important aspect to study since Peru is divided in three 
regions: coast, highlands and tropical rainforest. As a result, capital expenditures 
carried out in high altitudes might be slow or not carried out at all due to the many 
access problems. For example, a district located at high altitude might have poor 
roads and machinery for construction might have problems to reach the place of the 
project. This could be translated in delayed investment projects, which could 
impact the probability of reelection of a mayor in a negative way since public 
investments might take longer than expected to be completed.  
4.5. Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics for both the 2007-2010 and 2011-2014 terms are 
presented. These indicators have been constructed by merging all the discussed 
databases and the results are presented in the tables below: 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Electoral Term 2006-2010 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Ran for Reelection 2010 | Elected in 2006 1615 0.617 0.486 0 1 
Reelected in 2010 | Elected in 2006 996 0.315 0.465 0 1 
Age  | Elected in 2006 996 46.968 8.522 25 79 
Sex if male  | Elected in 2006 996 0.964 0.187 0 1 
Affiliated to a Regional Movement 996 0.459 0.499 0 1 
Affiliated to a National Political Party 996 0.419 0.494 0 1 
% Agg. Cap. Exp. 2008-2010  | Elected in 2006 996 0.741 0.135 0.215 0.996 
% Agg. Curr. Exp. 2008-2010  | Elected in 2006 996 0.848 0.097 0.109 0.995 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Electoral Term 2010-2014 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ran for Reelection 2010 | Elected in 2010 1605 0.626 0.484 0 1 
Reelected in 2014 | Elected in 2010 1005 0.292 0.455 0 1 
Age  | Elected in 2010 1005 47.905 8.753 27 75 
Sex if male  | Elected in 2010 1005 0.955 0.207 0 1 
% Agg. Cap. Exp. 2011-2014  | Elected in 2010 1005 0.714 0.134 0.150 0.991 
% Agg. Curr. Exp. 2011-2014  | Elected in 2010 1005 0.822 0.084 0.442 0.978 
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5. Empirical exploration 
5.1. Electoral statistics  
Not all mayors run for reelection. The results of the 2006 local government 
elections according to the JNE resulted in the election of 1615 mayors. Hence, for 
the reelection analysis of 2006-2010, we study the reelection process of 1615 
mayors. From this group, 996 decided to run for reelection in 2010 and 619 did not 
do so. Thus, almost 62% of mayors decide to run for office again.  From the 996 
incumbents, 314 are awarded with a second term in office, which is approximately 
32% of the incumbents who decide to run and 19% of the mayors elected in 2006.  
Also, in 2006, 347 out of the 1615 were already in their second term. From 
those incumbents, 185 sought a third term in office and 59 attained so.  Therefore, 
around 22% of the mayors in 2006 were in their second term and from this group 
53% decide to run for a third term with a rate of success of 32%. Hence, being 
reelected for a second term could influence the likelihood of running for a third 
office term. Moreover, having been in office for four or eight years could increase 
their probability of being reelected. Guided by these observations, a variable that 
indicates a second term is constructed and used in the model as a personal 
characteristic of the mayor.  
In the 2010, the reelection process the results are comparatively similar. The 
JNE awarded credentials to 1605 mayors as elected. From the 1639 processes, 34 
were declared invalid by the electoral organisms. From the 1605 mayors who got 
elected in 2010, 1005 strived to stay in office for another term in 2014.  293 were 
reelected to stay in office and 712 were not awarded with sufficient votes from the 
electorate. Hence, 29% of those who decided to run for office again were reelected 
and 18% of the mayors elected in 2010 continued in office in 2014. From these 
same 1605 mayors, 317 were reelected from 2006 to 2010. Then, approximately 
20% of the mayors elected in 2010 had been reelected for a second term. From this 
group of 317 incumbents, 198 sought to stay in power, which would account for 
around 63% looking for a third term and 67 achieved it. Hence, 47% of those who 
had already been in office for both 2006-2010 and 2010-2014 stayed in office for a 
third term. From the same group, 62 had been elected from 2002-2006 and 2006-
2010 and 17 stayed in office in 2014 for a fourth term.  
The statistics of both reelection periods 2006-2010 and 2010-2014 are similar in 
various manners. First, in both reelection processes, the reelection rate to stay in 
office was 22% and 18%, in 2010 and 2014, respectively.  Second, the mayors who 
had already been office for more than one term, 53% and 63% sought reelection for 
a third term, in 2010 and 2014 respectively. In the same manner, those who had 
already been in office for more than one term, were successful since 32% stayed in 
2010 and 47% stayed in 2014. Thus, indicating that mayors who have been in 
office for a various terms are more likely to seek reelection and are also likely to be 
reelected. To what extent does the electorate consider that two terms are sufficient 
for an administration to benefit the public? This question will be discussed, as 
results are revealing after the logistic regression analysis.  
5.2. The 2007-2010 Capital expenditure  
Mayors who were elected in 2006 started their terms the first days of 2007 and 
finished in 2010. Since there is data available for 739 local administrations in 2007 
and 1834 for the years 2008-2014, the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 are explored 
because the 1605 mayors cannot be followed in a comprehensive manner from 
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Figure 2. Aggregate budget expenditure 2008-2010 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
The distributions indicate the percentages of capital and current expenditures. 
At the aggregate level, incumbents who were reelected as mayors did not get 
reelected and those who did not attempt a reelection seem to have similar capital 
expenditures and the same median of 76%. Therefore, mayors overall seem to 
execute the same amount of their budgets throughout their terms.  
 
 
Figure 3. Budget expenditure in 2008 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
The capital expenditure carried out in 2008 is different from the aggregate of 
the 2008-10 term. The capital expenditure for mayors who were reelected is higher 
than for those who were not and those who did not seek reelection. Mayors who 
got reelected had a median capital expenditure of 77%. Those who were not 
reelected had a median of 74% and those who did not seek reelection 76%. Thus, it 
can be observed that in 2008, mayors who were awarded with votes to continue in 
office in 2011 had a higher capital expenditure than their peers. In terms of current 
expenditure, there is no virtual difference since both distributions seem to be 
similar and the median is the same for the three groups: 91%. 
 
 
Figure 4. Budget expenditure in2009 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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In 2009, the median capital expenditure for mayors who were reelected was 
76%. For those who sought reelection but did not attainit was 72% and for those 
who did not seek reelection was 72%, as well. Hence, those mayors who achieved 
reelection had higher levels of capital expenditure in 2008 and 2009 with medians 
of 77% and 76%, respectively. Also, mayors who got reelected achieveda higher 
level of current expenditure with a median of 86%. Those who did not get reelected 
had a current expenditure median of 84% and those who did not seek reelection 
achieved a median current expenditure of 85% of their budget.  
 
 
Figure 5. Budget expenditure in 2010 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In 2010 the pattern changes.Overall, the capital expenditures are higher for 
three groups, but mayors who got reelected had a lower level of capital expenditure 
with a median of 80%. Those who did not achieve reelection and those who did not 
seek reelection had a median of 86%. Even though mayors who achieved reelection 
had lower levels of capital expenditure in comparison to the other groups, the level 
of expenditure was higher than in previous years. The same pattern occurs in 
regards to current expenditure when mayors who got reelected had a lower level of 
capital expenditure with a median of 87% as opposed to their peers of the other 
groups who had a median of 89%.  
During the years 2008 and 2009, mayors who got reelected are characterized by 
a higher level of capital expenditure in comparison to those who did not get 
reelected and those who did not seek reelection. However, incumbents who sought 
reelection and did not achieve it had a higher level of capital expenditure during the 
electoral year of 2010.  Throughout this empirical exploration, a possible 
explanation could lead to the hypothesis that the electorate rewards mayors who 
had prolonged and high capital expenditures throughout their terms. In other 
words, those mayors who were constantly buildings roads, schools, electrifying 
towns and implementing sewages, thus providing for the basic needs of the local 
population, were likely to get reelected.  
5.3. The 2011-2014 capital expenditure 
A similar pattern is observed for the 2010-2014 electoral term. Mayors who are 
in office throughout these years seem to carry out capital expenditure in the same 
manner as in 2006-2010. It can be observed that throughout the term that mayors 
who are reelected had a high level of capital expenditure.  
An aggregate analysis of budget expenditure throughout the 2011-2014 term, 
indicates that there is no actual difference in the medians of those who are 
reelected, those who lose the reelection process and those who do not seek to 
continue office with a median of 73% of capital expenditure throughout the four-
year term and 84% of current expenditure for those who run for office and 83% for 
those who do not attempt a reelection process.  
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Figure 6. Aggregate budget expenditure 2011-2014 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In the same manner, the study of the timing of capital expenditure could shed 
light on certain aspects that increase the probability of reelection. Since there is 
available information for the four years mayors are in office in this 2011-2014 set, 
a more consistent pattern is observed by looking at the timing. In the first year of 
office, in 2011, their medians are the same for the three groups: 74% of capital 
expenditure and 83% of current spending. There seems to be no virtual difference 
between those who seek reelection, those who do not.  
 
 
Figure 7. Budget expenditure in 2011 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
The second year office indicates a difference in medians. Mayors who attain 
reelection in 2014 have a median capital expenditure of 75% of their capital budget 
in 2012 while those who do not attain it and those who do not seek reelection 
executed 74% of their budget for capital investments.Mayors who do not get 
reelected had a higher level of current expenditure in 2012 with 84% as opposed to 
the other two groups with 83%.  
 
Figure 8. Budget expenditure in 2012 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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In 2013, the third year in office, the year before the elections indicates marked 
differences.Mayors who are reelected for office in 2014, had a capital expenditure 
of 73%while those who do not attain it execute 71% of their capital expenditure. 
The third group, those who do not seek reelection, have the lowest level of the 
three with 68% of capital expenditure. This year is interesting and deserves a more 
rigorous discussion. First, in the year before the reelection process, mayors are 
more likely to carry out higher levels of capital expenditure because they are 
already in campaign and want to make their work more visible to the prospective 
electorate. Moreover, the dynamics of the budget could also be working in their 
favor. Public investment projects do not necessarily take a year to be completed. 
For example, a highway or a hospital could take a few years to be built. Hence, at 
the third year, if the mayor has been working consistently, the bigger projects with 
higher budgets could be finished or nearly finished. The completion of these major 
projects could be finally observed near the end of term and voters could be 
rewarding the timing of the capital expenditures and also the completion of them at 
the third or fourth year. This possible scenario could also help to account for the 
higher levels of capital expenditure since final payments and accruements are being 
done as projects are being completed.  
 
 
Figure 9. Budget expenditure in 2013 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
As in the previous 2006-2010 electoral term, the electoral year of 2010 and, in 
this case, 2014 is characterized by unprecedented high levels of capital 
expenditures in comparison to the years throughout the term. While in previous 
years, capital expenditures oscillated between 73% and 75%, in this year it reaches 
its peak at 83% of capital expenditure for mayors who got reelected. As in 2010, 
mayors who do not get reelected have a higher level of capital expenditure than 
those who get reelected. In 2014, those who do not get reelected attain 85% and 
those who do not seek reelection, 84% of capital expenditure.  
 
Figure 10. Budget expenditure in 2014 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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In both 2007-2010 and 2011-2014, aggregate statistics indicate no virtual 
difference between levels of capital expenditure with 76% and 73%, respectively. 
The dynamics seem to reside in the timing these public investment projects are 
carried out. The exploration of the capital expenditures at the annual level point out 
that mayors who are awarded with votes to continue in office for another term, 
have higher levels of capital expenditure in comparison to those who do not get 
reelected or seek another term in office. Thus, a reasonable hypothesis is that the 
electorate values the timing in which capital expenditures are carried out.  
The model and the empirical strategy advocated in this paper are derived from 
this empirical exploration. In other words, timing seems to matter and it will be 
explored since at the aggregative level there seems to be no virtual difference 
between those who get reelected and those who did not. Moreover, if evidence is 
found for this hypothesis it could indicate that mayors who benefit the electorate 
and the public while they are in office by making an efficient use of the resources 
they are assigned through the budget, are awarded with their votes. Hence, mayors 
who understand that by carrying out high levels of capital expenditures in a 
prolonged manner throughout their years in office, benefit themselves by fulfilling 
a possible ambition to stay in power and also the public. In other words, the 
previous system where a mayor could be immediately reelected could have 
provided the appropriate incentives for both politicians and the electorate to benefit 
from this decentralization process of delegating the ability to carry out public 
investments according to the need of local populations throughout time.  
5.4. Types of Capital Expenditure 
A more refined question would be to analyze the types or categories of capital 
expenditure carried out by local governments throughout Peru. According to the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance (M.E.F.), there are 25 categories (funciones). 
A disaggregated analysis would take into consideration these variables separately 
and explore which investments are likely to increase or decrease the probability of 
reelection. Moreover, timing seems to matter. Then, a secondary hypothesis would 
study the timing of how these different types of capital expenditure interact with 
the probability of a mayor getting reelected. Thus, a possible mechanism would 
indicate that if a mayor invests in education or transportation during the years in 
office, it could increase its probability of being in office for a second term. In the 
same manner, if a mayor carries out the reparation of roads or the implementation 
of water sewages (represented by the plumbing category during the electoral year), 
the electorate might be likely to punish that behavior for various reasons such as 
roads being block or a perception that a local authority is carrying out as many 
investments at the end of its term for the sole purpose of reelection instead of 
having done so consistently throughout the years in office.  
 
Table 3. Categories of Capital Expenditure 
Number Category 
1 Legislative 
2 Foreign Relations 
3 Planning, Management and Contingency Reserve 
4 Defense and National Security 
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19 Housing and Urban Development 
20 Health 
21 Culture and Sports 
22 Education 
23 Social Protection 
24 Social Prevision 
25 Public Debt 
Source: M.E.F. 
 
Using so many variables in a logistic regression could be problematic. Thus, we 
separate them into five groups: 
 
Table 4. Categories of Capital Expenditure Divided by Groups 
Group Categories 
Social Protection and National Security 3. Planning, Management, and Contingency Reserve 
4. Defense and National Security 
5. Public Order and Security 
17. Climate 
23. Social Protection 
24. Social Provision 
Productive Sectors 9. Trade 




Infrastructure and Development 15. Transportation 
16. Communications  
18. Plumbing 
19. Housing and Urban Development 
Basic Needs  12. Energy 
20. Health 
21. Culture and Sports 
22. Education 
Others 1. Legislative  
2. Foreign Relations 
6. Justice 
7. Labor  
25. Public Debt 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
The productive sector is where most jobs are located. The infrastructure and 
development groups have a common characteristic: they need to dig, destroy roads 
in order to carry out these investments. The basic needs group refers to projects 
such as the electrification of towns, construction of hospitals, schools and culture 
and sports is included due to anecdotal information that suggests that some 
electorates perceive as a necessity to have a soccer court and recreational areas.  
The group named as “others” are investment categories that might not seem as 
tangible as the rest since it includes investment in justice, labor, repayment of 
public debt, and foreign relations at the district level.  
 
6. Empirical strategy  
6.1. Aggregate capital expenditure   
The aim of this research paper is to estimate the impact of capital expenditure 
on the probability of reelection of mayors at the local government level in Peru. 
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Therefore two equations are constructed for the 2006-2010 and 2010-2014, 
respectively: 
 
Pr 𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛  2010 = 1  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2006) = 𝐹( 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2008 +
 𝛽2𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2009 +  𝛽3𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2010 +  𝛽4𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2008 +  𝛽5𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2009 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2010 +  Γ𝜃 +  Ψδ +
 Ω𝜙 + Θ𝜋 + 𝜇𝑖)                                (5) 
 
Pr 𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2014 = 1  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2010) = 𝐹( 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2011 +
 𝛽2𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2012 +  𝛽3𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2013 +  𝛽4𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2014 +  𝛽5𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2011 +  𝛽6𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2012 + 𝛽7𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2013 +
𝛽8𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2014  +  Γ𝜃 +  Ψδ +  Ω𝜙 + Θ𝜋 + 𝜇𝑖)                                         (6) 
 
where F(.) is a cumulative distribution of the logistic type, the dependent 
variable for (5) is whether he or she is reelected in 2010 or not given that he or she 
was elected as a mayor in 2006 for (5)  and whether he or she is reelected in 2014, 
given that he or she was elected as mayor in 2010 for (6), the 𝛽  indicates the 
percentage of capital expenditure executed on a yearly basis from 2008 to 2010 for 
(5) and from 2011 to 2014 for (6) for both capital and current expenditures, Γ is a 
vector that includes characteristic from the mayor such as age, sex, whether it was 
reelected in a previous electoral term, and type of political affiliation, Ψ is a vector 
that includes district-level characteristics such as percentage of the rural 
population, population size, poverty quintiles, Ω  is a vector that includes 
characteristic of the municipalities themselves such as human capital and canon 
income, Θ  represents the percentage of votes obtained in the 2006 municipal 
elections for (5) and 2010 municipal elections for (6), and  𝜇𝑖  is the error term. 
These specifications represent the importance of timing and will help in the 
determination of which years could be more important than others. We 
hypothesized that the years before the reelection are important as suggested in 
Portugal (see Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Sakura and Menezes, 2008). A possible 
problem might be that when the percentage of capital expenditure is calculated, 
most of the dynamics could be reside in the denominator and this could alter the 
results. Therefore, for robustness, two methodologies are used: capital expenditure 
per capita and capital expenditure per voter.  
Equations (5) and (6) are estimated with the same dependent variables and 
controls, but the indicators of capital expenditure change. In one set we use per 
capita expenditure and in another pair of equations we use expenditure per voter.  
The main model is the one that uses percentage of capital expenditure, but for 
consistency and robustness, the per capita and per voter models might provide are 
explored, which would provide further evidence for the hypothesis that capital 
expenditure increases the probability of being reelected. Moreover, by using 
population and voters as deflators, the notion that the denominator plays an 
important role in the estimation of the percentage of capital expenditure in the main 
model could be solved and more accurate and robust results could be observed. 
6.2. Disaggregated capital expenditure  
What types of capital expenditure impact on the probability of being reelected? 
This is a question of greater interest because it looks at detailed statistics once a 
relationship between aggregate capital expenditure and reelection has been 
established. Therefore, these equations will indicate the impact of investments in 
transportation, education, health, culture and sports, and many others on the 
probability of being reelected for another term as a mayor.  
The main equations are: 
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Pr 𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛  2010 = 1  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2006) =
𝐹( 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2008 +  𝛽2  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2009 + 𝛽3  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2010 +
 𝛽4  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2008 + 𝛽5  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2009 +  𝛽6  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2010 +  Γ𝜃 +  Ψδ +
 Ω𝜙 + Θ𝜋 + 𝜇𝑖)                    (7) 
 
 
Pr 𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2014 = 1  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2010) =
𝐹( 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2011 +  𝛽2  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2012 + 𝛽3  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2013 +
 𝛽4  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2014 +  𝛽5  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2011 +  𝛽6  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2012 +
 𝛽7  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2013 + 𝛽8  Π𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2014  +  Γ𝜃 +  Ψδ +  Ω𝜙 + Θ𝜋 + 𝜇𝑖)         (8) 
 
where F(.) is a cumulative distribution of the logistic type, the dependent 
variable for (7) is whether he or she is reelected in 2010 or not given that he or she 
was elected as a mayor in 2006 for (8)  and whether he or she is reelected in 2014, 
given that he or she was elected as mayor in 2010 for (8),  Π  is a vector that 
indicates the 5categories that group the 25 types of capital expenditures (see table 
4), the rest is equal to equations (5) and (6), respectively.  
For robustness, I use the per capita and per voter equations for these models, as 
well. Thus, each group of types of expenditure is divided per capita and per voter.  
6.3. Identification problem 
The expenditure carried out by the mayors and his or her administration could 
be correlated with non-observable variables. Generally speaking, politicians with 
higher levels of education and experience and ability are more likely to execute 
their budget designated for capital expenditures and that might increase their 
chances of being reelected. This could generate a non-observable bias due to an 
omitted variable problem. Since we have the percentage of votes obtained in the 
previous elections, the first time they were elected, this variable captures several 
non-observable attributes. Thus, we can control for the percentage of votes 
obtained in the 2006 for the 2010 reelection attempt and the votes obtained in 2010 
for the reelection process of 2014.  
 
7. Results 
7.1. Aggregate results 
7.1.1. The 2010-2014 period 
An increase in one standard deviation in percentage of capital expenditure in 
2013 is associated with an increase of 3.19 percentage points on the probability of 
being reelected in 2014. In the same manner, being young is also significant and it 
increases the probability of being reelected by 19.9 percentage points. A t-test for 
difference in means for the percentage of capital expenditures carried out from 
2011 to 2014 is done. There is evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
difference in means from those who are reelected and those who did not do so are 
not different from 0 with the exception of 2013. Thus, the year that matters the 
most is the one previous to the reelection. Having been elected for a third or forth 
term has a positive sign which could indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between having been in office and the probability of being reelected for another 
term.  
However, gender is not statistically significant in this set. The results are robust 
to a series of controls at the personal, district and municipality level. When the per 
capita and per voter models are ran, the results are consistent, and an increase of 
one standard deviation in the percentage of capital expenditure in 2013 increase the 
probability of reelection by 6.31 percentage points. Being young increases the 
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probability by 20.4 percentage points.The non-observables reflected on the voted 
obtained in the 2010 elections indicate that a one standard deviation increase on 
this variable increases the prospects of getting reelected by 10.3 percentage points.  
 










          
% Votes obtained in 2010 
  
1.122*** 1.112*** 
   
(0.143) (0.143) 
% Curr. E. 2011 
   
0.137 
    
(0.134) 
% Curr. E. 2012 
   
-0.207 
    
(0.134) 
% Curr. E. 2013 
   
0.163 
    
(0.155) 
% Curr. E. 2014 
   
-0.191 
    
(0.158) 
% Capital E. 2011 0.0470 0.0323 0.0164 0.0148 
 
(0.0745) (0.0767) (0.0744) (0.0756) 
% Capital E. 2012 0.00900 -0.0174 -0.0298 -0.0247 
 
(0.0775) (0.0774) (0.0756) (0.0765) 
% Capital E. 2013 0.216** 0.203** 0.181** 0.185** 
 
(0.0882) (0.0877) (0.0860) (0.0864) 
% Capital E. 2014 -0.0519 -0.0311 -0.0258 -0.0234 
 
(0.0707) (0.0701) (0.0685) (0.0689) 
Is a male candidate 
 
0.0127 -0.0110 -0.00120 
  
(0.0686) (0.0683) (0.0674) 
Young (less than 40) 
 
0.206*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 
  
(0.0421) (0.0412) (0.0413) 
Elected 2006-2010 
 
0.0784** 0.0265 0.0238 
  
(0.0380) (0.0362) (0.0361) 
% of Rural Population 
 
-0.0356 -0.0294 -0.0212 
  
(0.0648) (0.0632) (0.0632) 
Ln Pop. 2011 
 
-0.00505 0.0221 0.0229 
  
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142) 
District in Poverty Quintile1 
 
-0.0496 0.00631 0.00642 
  
(0.0776) (0.0771) (0.0770) 
District in Poverty Quintile 2 
 
-0.0316 0.0201 0.0228 
  
(0.0693) (0.0697) (0.0698) 
District in Poverty Quintile 3 
 
-0.00364 0.0416 0.0434 
  
(0.0689) (0.0720) (0.0722) 
Altitude 
 
-2.35e-05* -9.21e-06 -1.02e-05 
  
(1.31e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.29e-05) 
     Observations 1,005 1,004 1,004 1,004 
Adjusted R-squared 0.00654 0.0423 0.0869 0.0907 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Therefore, there is evidence to support the notion that capital investment carried 
out before the electoral year increases the probability of being reelected. 
Specifically, the capital expenditure in the year before the reelection process seems 
to be the most statistically significant. Factors such as being young and other 
personal characteristics seem to increase the probability of getting reelected, as 
well. Altitude seems to impact on the probability in a negative manner due to the 
sign. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the timing of capital expenditure is 
likely to improve the probability of reelection. 
7.1.2. The 2006-2010period 
The results from equation (5) provide evidence to support that timing and 
capital expenditure before the electoral year increase the probability of getting 
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reelected for another term in 2010.A one standard deviation in the percentage of 
capital expenditure increases the probability of being reelected by 2.73 percentage 
points in 2008, 3.61 percentage points in 2009 and it decreases it by 8.2 percentage 
points in 2010. Thus, there is a positive relationship between capital expenditure 
and the probability of being reelected in the period before the electoral year. This 
relationship is negative in 2010. The results are robust to a series of controls that 
account for personal characteristics of the mayor, district, municipality and the 
votes obtained in 2006 election. In the 2010-14 the sign for capital expenditure in 
the electoral year is also negative which could indicate that high levels of capital 
expenditures in the electoral year could be detrimental to the reelection efforts.This 
question can be answered in a more refined way, once the disaggregated results are 
observed.  
Also, by performing a t-test for difference in means, in 2009, a year before the 
2010 elections, the hypothesis that the means for those who get reelected and those 
who do not are equal in terms of capital expenditure of that year can be rejected. 
As a result, there is more evidence to suggest that the most important year before a 
reelection process is the year before the election, 2009 in this case. Additionally, a 
one standard deviation on the percentage of votes obtained in 2006 (the instrument 
used to capture non-observable variables)increases the probability of reelection by 
10.5percentage points. Being a male incumbent increases the probability by 20.4 
percentage points, being less than 40 years of age increase the probability by 10.4 
percentage points, being a mayor in the poorest poverty quintile reduces the 
probability by 17 percentage points and being in the second poorest by 12 
percentage points. The type of political party does not seem to be significant. 
 
Table 6. Timing of Capital Expenditure 2008-2010 










          
% Votes obtained in 2006 
  
1.121*** 1.123*** 
   
(0.150) (0.150) 
% Capital E. 2008 0.151* 0.200** 0.138 0.146* 
 
(0.0879) (0.0886) (0.0867) (0.0885) 
% Capital E. 2009 0.276*** 0.231** 0.198** 0.205** 
 
(0.0937) (0.0925) (0.0904) (0.0925) 
% Capital E. 2010 -0.523*** -0.548*** -0.532*** -0.505*** 
 
(0.0874) (0.0879) (0.0851) (0.0869) 
% Curr. E. 2008 
   
0.0955 
    
(0.157) 
% Curr. E. 2009 
   
-0.0607 
    
(0.141) 
% Curr. E. 2010 
   
-0.179 
    
(0.132) 
Is a male candidate 
 
0.199*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 
  
(0.0540) (0.0514) (0.0515) 
Young (less than 40) 
 
0.120*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
  
(0.0383) (0.0369) (0.0369) 
District in Poverty Quintile 1 
 
-0.213*** -0.175** -0.174** 
  
(0.0674) (0.0696) (0.0703) 
District in Poverty Quintile 2 
 
-0.158** -0.117* -0.116* 
  
(0.0625) (0.0649) (0.0652) 
District in Poverty Quintile 3 
 
-0.0569 -0.0256 -0.0268 
  
(0.0621) (0.0644) (0.0646) 
% of Rural Population 
 
0.0221 0.0514 0.0482 
  
(0.0637) (0.0621) (0.0622) 
Ln Pop. of 2008 
 
-0.0171 0.00784 0.00905 
  
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0147) 
Altitude 
 
-1.97e-05 -8.94e-06 -8.28e-06 
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(1.30e-05) (1.28e-05) (1.28e-05) 
Elected in 2002-06 
 
-0.0279 -0.0909*** -0.0932*** 
  
(0.0360) (0.0334) (0.0333) 
Affiliated to a Regional Movement 
 
0.0155 0.0178 0.0195 
  
(0.0584) (0.0570) (0.0569) 
Affiliated to a Local Organization 
 
0.0182 -0.00211 0.000374 
  
(0.0858) (0.0825) (0.0826) 
Affiliated to a National Political Party  
 
0.0160 0.00911 0.00956 
  
(0.0588) (0.0574) (0.0573) 
     Observations 996 995 995 995 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0320 0.0790 0.119 0.121 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
7.2. Self-Selection and Random Choice 
Not all mayors decide to run for reelection. Approximately, 40% of them decide 
not to do so in both periods 2006-2010 and 2010-2014. Hence, I use a logistic 
regression to identify possible factors that could contribute to the decision of 
whether to seek reelection or not. Equations (5) and (6) estimate the probability of 
an incumbent who decides to run for reelection in 2010 and 2014, respectively:  
 
Pr 𝑅𝑢𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛  2010 = 1  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2006) = 𝐹( 𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2008 +  𝛽2𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2009 +  + 𝛽4𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2008 +  𝛽5𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2009  +  Γ𝜃 +  Ψδ +  Ω𝜙 +
Θ𝜋 + 𝜇𝑖)                                             (9) 
 
Pr 𝑅𝑢𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 2014 = 1  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 2010) = 𝐹 𝛽0 +
𝛽1𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2011 +  𝛽2𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2012 +  𝛽3𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑖2013 +  + 𝛽5𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2011 + 𝛽6𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2012 +
 𝛽7𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐2013 + + Γ𝜃 +  Ψδ +  Ω𝜙 + Θ𝜋 + 𝜇𝑖                            (10) 
 
where the dependent variable is discrete indicating a 1 if the candidates runs for 
reelection and a 0 otherwise,𝛽 indicates capital and current expenditures from the 
years previous to the electoral year. Then, for (9) there is information from 2008 
and 2009 and for equation (10) there is information from 2011 to 2013. The 
controls for (9) and (10) are the same as equations (5) and (6), respectively.  
The results obtained from (9) indicate that gender, altitude, the poorest poverty 
quintile, the natural log of the 2008 population and having been elected as a mayor 
from 2002-2006 are variables associated to the probability of running for re-
election. An increase in one standard deviation of altitude seems to reduce the 
probability of reelection by 6.1 percentage points, an increase in one standard 
deviation of the log of the 2008 population increases the probability by 3.2 
percentage points, and being a mayor in the poorest poverty quintile decreases the 
probability by 19.2 percentage points.  
The results from (10) to indicate that percentage of capital expenditure executed 
in 2011 and 2013 are statistically significant and that an increase in one standard 
deviation on the percentage of capital expenditure in 2011 and 2013 decreases the 
probability by decreasing 3.05 percentage points in 2011 and increases it by 3.28 
percentage points in 2013. 
Also, altitude of the district seems to matter since an increase in one standard 
deviation from altitudedecreases the probability of running for reelection by 14.3 
percentage points. By looking at the signs, there seems to be a negative relationship 
of running for reelection with the information from 2011 because one has just 
started his or her term. However, the sign changes in 2013, when there is more 
information on what voters want and how one has performed throughout the therm. 
Then, it is intuitive to think that the performance of 2013, has a positive 
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relationship with the prospect of a reelection in 2014 because incumbents already 
have an idea of how voters perceive them and the way in which public expenditure 
has been carried out throughout these years.  
There are several differences and similarities found in the results of these two 
identification equations. First, re-election is less common in districts located at 
higher altitudes. A possible mechanism might be associated with the fact that it is 
difficult to carry out capital expenditures due to the harshness of the high altitude 
environment. Secondly, in eq. (10) capital expenditure in 2013 has a positive sign 
which could be indicate of the importance of this year for making a decision. It is 
possible that incumbents wait until the year before elections to make a final 
decision, having taken into consideration how they did, the perceived opinion of 
the public and other factors such as contestants to make a final choice. The 
negative sign in altitude could be linked to the inability of being able to perform 
projects in both2011 and 2012. The fact that the sign is negative could be indicate 
that mayors who are located in high altitude districts might reconsider running for 
mayor due the inability of carrying out public investments and environmental 
hardships.  
Even though having been in office does not seem to be significant, the signs for 
having been in office between 2006-2010, the previous term is negative as well as 
having been in office between 2002 and 2006.  This could open the question of 
whether applying for a third term is desirable by most mayors. These results are not 
consistent with the fact that approximately more than 50% of those who have 
already been in office for more than one term, decide to run for a third reelection. 
Age also has a negative sign which could indicate that mayors who are older, are 
not likely to run for reelection. Nevertheless, being young or not is not significant, 
but has a negative sign for both (9) and (10). 
Another possible way of correcting for the self-selection bias is the argument 
that those who do not seek reelection and the incumbents who do not succeed have 
virtually similar capital and current expenditures throughout their terms. By 
looking at the data exploration, mayors who decide not to run and incumbents who 
lose are similar when the timing of their capital expenditures is analyzed (see 
Figures 2-9). Therefore, randomization could be taking place and this statistical 
phenomenon could determine that the three groups are virtually similar and what 
makes them decide whether they seek reelection or not is a random element. Thus, 
providing consistency for the probabilistic model since the element of bias in the 
estimates would be present in a less significant manner.  
Further evidence is provided when a hypothesis test performed as a t-test for 
difference in means is carried out for the capital expenditures throughout the 2008-
2010 and 2011-2014 periods. Evidence is found to support the notion that the 
means are not dissimilar in the years 2008 and 2009. However, the means are not 
similar in 2010. In the same manner, evidence is found to support that the 
hypothesis that the difference in meansis equal to 0 is rejected in 2013, but that is 
not the case for previous years. Thus, indicating that the performance of the year 
before the reelection could be influential in the decision for the 2011-2014 period, 
since the years before do not seem to be statistically different and the evidence is 
found not to reject the hypothesis that the means are equal. This provides evidences 
to support the idea that randomization could be taking place and the results are 
likely to be unbiased.  
This empirical exploration, combined with the results from the identification 
equations (9) and (10) where capital expenditures of the years before the reelection, 
2009 and 2013, seem to be important in making a decision of seeking reelection. 
As a result, candidates who do not consider that they have performed a high capital 
expenditure term might decide not to seek reelection. Since those who seek 
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reelection and lose and those who do not decide to run are virtually, similar, again, 
randomization might be taking place in either fashion.  
7.3. Disaggregate Results 
Since there is evidence to support the hypothesis that capital expenditure 
increases the probability of a mayor being reelected for another term, a more 
refined question can be explored: what type of capital expenditure could help a 
mayor increase his or her probability of being reelected? This is the second layer of 
the hypothesis.  
In order to answer this question, the 25 types of investments (funciones) have 
been group into five categories: social protection and security, productive sector, 
infrastructure and development, basic needs and others.  
For the 2011-14 capital expenditure period, a one standard deviation on the 
percentage of votes obtained in 2010 (the instrument used to capture non-
observable characteristics of the mayor and correct for possible bias) increases the 
probability of being reelected by 9.26 percentage points. Investments carried out on 
security tend to have a positive sign throughout the period indicating a possible 
increase in probability. However, in the electoral year, 2014, if capital expenditures 
are carried out on security, an increase of one standard deviation on security results 
in a decrease of 2.7 percentage points on the reelection prospects of 2014. These 
results are statistically meaningful.  
Similarly, when the infrastructure and development group is studied, there are 
positive signs on the years before the reelection, indicating that projects that relate 
to communications, transportation and plumbing before the electoral year might 
increase the probability of being reelected in 2014. However, a negative sign is 
found in 2014 indicating that if these projects are carried out in the electoral year, it 
might have a negative impact on the probability of being reelected.  
In 2013, an increase of one standard deviation on capital expenditure on basic 
needs increases the probability of being reelected by 3.5 percentage points. In other 
words, investments projects that relate to energy, health, education and sports and 
culture have a positive impact on the reelection prospects. This is statistically 
significant.  
An interesting aspect to observe is that investments in the productive sector 
such as fishing, agriculture and livestock, tourism, mining, trade have a negative 
sign during 2011 and 2012, and a positive sign by 2013 and 2014. It could suggest 
that investments in these areas to create jobs might take longer to be perceived as 
tangible benefit by the electorate. Nevertheless, the information is explored there 
are interesting findings: mayors who spend less on these categories tend to be 
reelected. Consistently, mayors who spend more on these categories are less likely 
to get reelected. This is a counter-intuitive observation since one would expect that 
investments in productive sectors at a local level would be associated with a higher 
approval from the public. A possible explanation would reveal that the preferences 
of the public tend to favor basic needs such as electricity, health and schools to be 
provided by the public and not the creation of a productive sector. Therefore, the 
electorate would applaud investments that result in the provision of public goods 
and not in the creation of jobs. An alternative interpretation, and not far from the 
first interpretation would suggest that the electorate would value the provision of 
public goods and consider that enterprises and jobs should be generated by the free 
market, microenterprises, companies and not by the local government.  
For the 2008-2010 capital expenditure period, a one standard deviation in 
percentage of votes obtained in 2006 (which is used as an instrument to capture 
non-observable characteristics of the mayor and reduce possible bias) increases the 
probability of being reelected in 2010 by 9.3 percentage points, a one standard 
deviation on the percentage of capital expenditure on security in 2008 increases the 
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probability by 2.72 percentage points, in 2009 by 4.2 percentage points and an 
increase in one standard deviation in 2010 causes the probability of being reelected 
to be reduced by 4.3 percentage points.  
In the same manner, an increase of one standard deviation on the percentage of 
capital expenditure on infrastructure and development reduces the proclivity of 
being reelected as a mayor in 2010 by 11.3 percentage points which is consistent 
with the negative signs found in 2014. This finding is quite intuitive since this 
group considers communications, transportation and plumbing. In other words, 
these are public investments that are characterized by the digging, destruction and 
reconstruction of roads. Anecdotal information suggests that some mayors tend to 
destroy roads in order to reconstruct them in the electoral year. This might cause an 
increase in traffic and an unpleased electorate. Therefore, it is intuitive to observe a 
decrease in the probability of being reelected after performing these types of 
investments in the electoral year since a prospective electorate might perceive the 
execution and timing of these projects with mistrust. Possibly, they might question 
the timing of these projects since the mayor had three years to do this, and 
suddenly he or she decides to do so at the very last moment, possibly, to portray an 
image of someone who carries out projects for the benefit of the community.  
Additionally, the group named basic needs that encompasses the categories of 
energy, health, education, and culture and sports seems to have a positive effect on 
the reelection prospects. An increase in one standard deviation on the percentage of 
capital expenditure for basic needs in 2008 increases the probability of being 
reelected in 2010 by 2.5 percentage points. Thus, electrifying rural areas, building 
schools, hospitals and football courts are likely to increase the probability of being 
reelected. However, an opposite result occurs in the electoral year. A one increase 
in the standard deviation of the same group in 2010 results in a 2.7 percentage 
point decrease on the prospective of being reelected. 
7.4. Possible Mechanisms  
Voters seem to reward the completion of projects and that might be reflected in 
the fact that 2009 and 2013, the years before the 2010 and 2014 elections seem to 
matter the most. The resultsfrom thelogisticregressions indicate positive 
coefficients for capital expendituresin both2009 and 2013, which is consistent with 
the notion that voters reward constant and prolonged capital expenditure. By the 
third year, the electorate can evaluate the administration of a mayor. It is also 
consistent that mostprojects characterized by large budgetsmight take a year or two 
to be completed, they might take three or four and by then, there is likely to be a 
higher capital expenditure in order to finish these projects and prospective voters 
observe the results of the local administration by then.  
By analyzing disaggregated results, there is evidence to suggest that it is 
important how much budget is being executed, but also certain types of 
expenditures will make the electorate more prone to vote for the reelection of their 
mayor. It is interesting to observe that plumbing, transportation and communication 
investments in 2010 and 2014 seem to hinder the prospects by having negative 
signs. These investments can be characterized by the destruction of roads in order 
to build or repair roads and install pipes under the ground. They would result in 
roads being blocked and increments in traffic jams, which could result in an 
increase in disapproval of a prospective electorate. Some voters might maintain 
that the mayor is carrying out these projects in order to show the public that they 
are doing something for the local population, but other might perceive that the local 
administration could have done it before. Hence, punishing the bad timing and 
negative consequences of the project.Therefore, providing support for the 
hypothesis of this paper that timing matters when it comes to capital expenditure 
and voters reward (or punish) this behavior from local administrations.  
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Following the same line of thought, voters do reward certain investments of 
local administrations such as projects inenergy, security, culture and sports, 
communications, transportation in the years before the electoral process. These 
results shed light on a debate that has been taking place in Peru of whether local 
administrations cover the needs of the population or not and also what are the 
needs of the population. By observing these results, the electorate reveals their 
preferences and needs. The public seems to demand electrification projects, 
security, more roads. To put it simply, the public is expecting the local government 
toprovide them with public goods. Mayors who successfully understand the needs 
of the local population and improve their quality of life will get reelected. This 
seems self-evident, but when observing investments in other fields such as in the 
productive sector (that encompass tourism, trade, fishing, mining, and industry) 
that hinder the prospects of a reelection it raises a question of whether the 
electorate wants the provision of public goods from the local government or wants 
them to develop the district economically. The disaggregated results would suggest 
that they prefer the provision of public goods leaving the question of development 
to whom? A possible answer suggested by a climate of micro enterprises and free 
market in Peru would indicate that the electorate does not expect a local 
administration to intervene in this aspect. There is a possibility that the public 
perceives economic development in productive areas such as fishing, tourism, and 
trade as efforts from themselves, the market or the central government. Another 
possible answer is that since Peru is a country with high poverty levels, the 
electorate values projects that are regarded as beneficial to their direct needsrather 
than projects that do not impact on them as directly since they might have the 
human capital to be hired by industries that involve fishing, mining, trade, or 
tourism.  
Moreover, according to ONPE officials, voters seem to reward public 
investments that are visible. Then, mayors would be more likely to invest in 
construction projects, building soccer courts, that might be faster than an economic 
policy to foster investments in tourism, agriculture and livestock, trade, mining, 
and industry. This would be consistent with the results from the group constructed 
as Others. This group takes into consideration investments on legislative, foreign 
relations, labor, and public debt, which are types of investments that might not 
result in immediate, tangible and observable results. Therefore, these investments 
involve policy making, planning and long-term results which are characterized by 
being not statistically significant and with low levels of capital expenditure.  
Therefore, mayors might not be likely to carry out long-term policies that might 
not increase their probability of being reelected for a next term which is consistent 
with the data exploration where we find that mayors who do not get reelected have 
higher levels capital expenditure in the productive areas, suggesting economic 
policies which might not result in tangible benefits for the community in the four-
yearterm. That might explain why mayors who are elected are characterized by low 
levels expenditures in areas such as mining, tourism, trade, industry and high levels 
of expenditure in short-term and more tangible capital investments in areas such as 
infrastructure, the provision of public goods (measured through the basic needs 
group and social protection and security). Hence, the electorate wants short-term 
tangible projects and the provision of public goods.  
An alternative mechanism that could explain the aggregate dynamics of 
reelected mayors executing less capital in comparison to their peers who are not 
reelected, would be the fact that mayors who are better at campaigning are doing so 
during 2010 and 2014. Therefore, even though they have lower levels of capital 
expenditures that year, the electorate rewards them with votes. This would be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the electorate rewards high and prolonged 
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capital expenditure since mayors who are reelected tend to be characterized by that, 
but the electorate would be likely to reward campaigning, good politicians, kissing 
babies, popularity showers and what not. I do not have a way to control for this 
since I do not posses approval information per district for the studied districts 
throughout 2006-2014. Therefore, testing for approval and data on campaigning 
might not be accessible. Hence, the instruments of percentages of votes obtained in 
the 2006 and 2010 elections are also important in the reelection process because 
they capture non-observable variables such as charisma, campaign organization, 




In conclusion, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that mayors who have 
highlevels ofbudget expenditure are rewarded with votes to be reelected. As a 
whole, the aggregate budget expenditure throughout the four years of tenure does 
seem to be different for those who are reelected and incumbents who are not. 
Nevertheless, timing seems to be important and the type of expenditure, as well. In 
other words, mayors who have high levels of capital expenditure, as in public 
investments, throughout their terms are awarded with votes. In particular, mayors 
who have higher levels of budget expenditures in the year before the electoral year. 
Therefore, 2009 and 2013 are important years because projects might be coming to 
an end and the electorate would have already evaluated the administration in terms 
of efficiency. As a result, the public might reward or punish incumbents who seek 
reelection at the ballots.  
To recapitulate, if a mayor is elected in 2006 for office, he or she will start in 
2007. Mayors who are likely to get reelected will be characterized throughout 
2007, 2008 and 2009 with high degrees of capital expenditure translated into 
buildings roads, highways, providing security to the local populations throughout 
their terms. In 2010, the electoral year, after a four-year term, mayors who get 
reelected will be characterized by an increase in capital and current expenditures, 
but a decline in comparison to their peers who do not get reelected or do not 
attempt reelection. The possible reason could be a different allocation of time in 
comparison to other mayors. Mayors who seek reelection will certainly allocate the 
time of 2010, the year of the next election, to their campaigns. Their chances of 
being elected could be higher, but we do not have a way of testing this hypothesis. 
The same occurs for the 2010-2014 period. Mayorswho are elected in 2010, have a 
similar capital expenditure behavior throughout their terms and also during the 
electoral year.  
A second layer of the analysis, one disaggregated into five groups: social 
protection and security, productive sector, infrastructure and development, basic 
needs and a category named as others, reveals that not only timing is important in 
the execution of public finance projects, but also the type of projects. Results 
suggest that the provision of public goods in the form of electrification projects, 
building of schools, hospital, and roads during the electoral term and before the 
year of a prospective reelection are likely to have a positive impact on the 
probability of being reelected. Moreover, projects related to infrastructure and 
development such as the construction, reparation of roads, implementation of 
sewages and other projects that are characterized by the destruction of roads in 
2010 and 2014, the electoral years, have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on the reelection prospects.  
As a result, they reward local administrators with their votes. The electorate 
evaluates the administration throughout the first three years and if a prolonged and 
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constant work has been observed, incumbents attain reelection. On the contrary, if 
the types of expenditure performed are not in line with the local preferences this 
might result in a decrease in the probability of being reelected as has been observed 
in the results when issues related to climate are carried out as projects instead of 
roads or electrification projects before the electoral year. A possible explanation 
could be that since some of these projects are to satiate local and urgent needs of 
the poorest populations in Peru, there are needs such as a road or light at home that 
are more valued than a social prevision plan and that is why voters reward certain 
types of capital expenditures and punish others.  
Additionally, mayors who are likely to be reelected arecharacterized by being 
younger (less than forty years of age), and having high levels of capital expenditure 
are likely to be reelected. Also, the type of political party they are affiliated with, 
whether it is a regional movement, a national political party, a local organization or 
a political alliance does not seem to influence the probability of reelection. A 
possible explanation could be that voters do not identify themselves with a 
particular party or regional movement, but with a person for the case of Peru. 
Hence, personal characteristics such as age, gender, and human capital, abilities for 
being a good politician might be rewarded and the support increased when the 
politician is also a good administrator by performing several projects of certain 
types throughout their tenures. 
In conclusion, there is evidence to support that high levels of capital 
expenditure carried out throughout 2007-2010 and 2011-2014 do have a positive 
impact on the probability of a mayor being reelected. Secondly, the types of 
expenditure carried out by local administration do matter and also have an impact 
on the probability of reelection of a mayor. Thirdly, a combination of appropriate 
timing and investing in the types of capital expenditure that reflect the immediate 
needs of the population seem to be the most important factors to attain reelection. 
Fourthly, personal, district-level, and municipal characteristics also contribute to a 
higher probability of being reelected. 
Possible aspects to be studied in the future are the inclusion of a corruption 
variable. Ferrazand Finan (2009) implement a corruption variable for the case of 
Brazil, but that is a particular case where the auditory entity, the one in charge of 
identifying corruption within the Brazilian local administrations, publish a detailed 
report. In Peru, that information is not available yet. The Contraloría General de la 
República has published a similar report in 2013, but that is only one observation 
in time. Since our study starts in 2006 and ends in 2014, another instrument must 
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